The defendant bears the burden to prove that the undisclosed evidence was both material and favorable. In other words, the defendant must prove that there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the trial would have been different, had the evidence been disclosed by the prosecutor. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 (1955). Bagles and Kyles Court further defined the “materiality” standard, outlining the four aspects of materiality. First, the “reasonable probability” of a different result is not a question of whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines the confidence in the outcome of the trial. The second aspect is that it is not a sufficiency of evidence test, and the defendant only has to show that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict. Third aspect is that there is no need for a harmless error review, because a Brady violation, by definition, could not be treated as a harmless error. Fourth and final aspect of materiality the Kyles Court stressed was that the suppressed evidence must be considered collective, not item by item, looking at the cumulative effect to determine whether a reasonable probability is reached. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-438.
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