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Posted on: September 5, 2024 at 14:55:46 CT
90Tiger STL
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https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.440
The attorney for the government should not, except with the approval of the United States Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General, enter into a plea agreement if the defendant maintains his/her innocence with respect to the charge or charges to which he/she offers to plead guilty. In a case in which the defendant tenders a plea of guilty but denies committing the offense to which he/she offers to plead guilty, the attorney for the government should make an offer of proof of all facts known to the government to support the conclusion that the defendant is in fact guilty. See also JM 9-16.015, which discusses the approval requirement.
Comment. JM 9-27.440 concerns plea agreements involving "Alford" pleas—guilty pleas entered by defendants who nevertheless claim to be innocent. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit a court from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who simultaneously maintains his/her innocence, so long as the plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently and there is a strong factual basis for it. The Court reasoned that there is no material difference between a plea of nolo contendere, where the defendant does not expressly admit his/her guilt, and a plea of guilty by a defendant who affirmatively denies his/her guilt.
Despite the constitutional validity of Alford pleas, such pleas should be avoided except in the most unusual circumstances, even if no plea agreement is involved and the plea would cover all pending charges. As one court put it, "the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who denied his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and going to jail." See United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971). Consequently, it is often preferable to have a jury resolve the factual and legal dispute between the government and the defendant, rather than have government attorneys encourage defendants to plead guilty under circumstances that the public might regard as questionable or unfair. For this reason, government attorneys should not enter into Alford plea agreements, without the approval of the United States Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Apart from refusing to enter into a plea agreement, however, the degree to which the Department can express its opposition to Alford pleas may be limited. Although a court may accept a proffered plea of nolo contendere after considering "the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice," Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11 (a)(3), at least one court has concluded that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to accept a guilty plea "solely because the defendant does not admit the alleged facts of the crime." United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Bednarski, supra; United States v. Boscoe, 518 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, government attorneys can and should discourage Alford pleas by refusing to agree to terminate prosecutions where an Alford plea is proffered to fewer than all of the charges pending. As is the case with guilty pleas generally, if such a plea to fewer than all the charges is tendered and accepted over the government's objection, the attorney for the government should proceed to trial on any remaining charges not barred on double jeopardy grounds unless the United States Attorney, or in cases handled by Departmental attorneys, the appropriate Assistant Attorney General, approves dismissal of those charges.
Government attorneys should also take full advantage of the opportunity afforded by Rule 11(b)(3) in an Alford case to thwart the defendant's efforts to project a public image of innocence. Under Rule 11(b)(3), the court must be satisfied that there is "a factual basis" for a guilty plea. However, the Rule does not require that the factual basis for the plea be provided only by the defendant. See United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1975); Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, attorneys for the government in Alford cases should endeavor to establish as strong a factual basis for the plea as possible not only to satisfy the requirement of Rule 11(b)(3), but also to minimize the adverse effects of Alford pleas on public perceptions of the administration of justice.
[updated February 2018] [cited in JM 6-4.330; JM 9-28.1300]
Edited by 90Tiger at 14:56:29 on 09/05/24
The attorney for the government should not, except with the approval of the United States Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General, enter into a plea agreement if the defendant maintains his/her innocence with respect to the charge or charges to which he/she offers to plead guilty. In a case in which the defendant tenders a plea of guilty but denies committing the offense to which he/she offers to plead guilty, the attorney for the government should make an offer of proof of all facts known to the government to support the conclusion that the defendant is in fact guilty. See also JM 9-16.015, which discusses the approval requirement.
Comment. JM 9-27.440 concerns plea agreements involving "Alford" pleas—guilty pleas entered by defendants who nevertheless claim to be innocent. In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit a court from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who simultaneously maintains his/her innocence, so long as the plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently and there is a strong factual basis for it. The Court reasoned that there is no material difference between a plea of nolo contendere, where the defendant does not expressly admit his/her guilt, and a plea of guilty by a defendant who affirmatively denies his/her guilt.
Despite the constitutional validity of Alford pleas, such pleas should be avoided except in the most unusual circumstances, even if no plea agreement is involved and the plea would cover all pending charges. As one court put it, "the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who denied his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and going to jail." See United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (1st Cir. 1971). Consequently, it is often preferable to have a jury resolve the factual and legal dispute between the government and the defendant, rather than have government attorneys encourage defendants to plead guilty under circumstances that the public might regard as questionable or unfair. For this reason, government attorneys should not enter into Alford plea agreements, without the approval of the United States Attorney and the appropriate Assistant Attorney General. Apart from refusing to enter into a plea agreement, however, the degree to which the Department can express its opposition to Alford pleas may be limited. Although a court may accept a proffered plea of nolo contendere after considering "the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice," Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11 (a)(3), at least one court has concluded that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to accept a guilty plea "solely because the defendant does not admit the alleged facts of the crime." United States v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Bednarski, supra; United States v. Boscoe, 518 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, government attorneys can and should discourage Alford pleas by refusing to agree to terminate prosecutions where an Alford plea is proffered to fewer than all of the charges pending. As is the case with guilty pleas generally, if such a plea to fewer than all the charges is tendered and accepted over the government's objection, the attorney for the government should proceed to trial on any remaining charges not barred on double jeopardy grounds unless the United States Attorney, or in cases handled by Departmental attorneys, the appropriate Assistant Attorney General, approves dismissal of those charges.
Government attorneys should also take full advantage of the opportunity afforded by Rule 11(b)(3) in an Alford case to thwart the defendant's efforts to project a public image of innocence. Under Rule 11(b)(3), the court must be satisfied that there is "a factual basis" for a guilty plea. However, the Rule does not require that the factual basis for the plea be provided only by the defendant. See United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1975); Irizarry v. United States, 508 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Davis, 516 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1975). Accordingly, attorneys for the government in Alford cases should endeavor to establish as strong a factual basis for the plea as possible not only to satisfy the requirement of Rule 11(b)(3), but also to minimize the adverse effects of Alford pleas on public perceptions of the administration of justice.
[updated February 2018] [cited in JM 6-4.330; JM 9-28.1300]
Edited by 90Tiger at 14:56:29 on 09/05/24
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