"The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-

Posted on: May 23, 2025 at 06:27:36 CT

private entity that follows in the distinctive tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States."

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a966_1b8e.pdf

Context:

For 90 years, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295
U. S. 602 (1935), has stood as a precedent of this Court.
And not just any precedent. Humphrey’s undergirds a sig-
nificant feature of American governance: bipartisan admin-
istrative bodies carrying out expertise-based functions with
a measure of independence from presidential control. The
two such agencies involved in this application are the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB). But there are many others—
among them, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Federal Re-
serve Board. Congress created them all, though at different
times, out of one basic vision. It thought that in certain
spheres of government, a group of knowledgeable people
from both parties—none of whom a President could remove
without cause—would make decisions likely to advance the
long-term public good. And that congressional judgment,
Humphrey’s makes clear, creates no conflict with the Con-
stitution. Rejecting a claim that the removal restriction en-
acted for the FTC interferes with “the executive power,” the
Humphrey’s Court held that Congress has authority, in cre-
ating such “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial” bodies, to
“forbid their [members’] removal except for cause.” Id., at 626, 629. Indeed, that conclusion “cannot well be doubted.”
Id., at 629; see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349
(1958) (reaffirming Humphrey’s).

The current President believes that Humphrey’s should
be either overruled or confined. See Application 14; Letter
from S. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, to Rep. J. Raskin,
Re: Restrictions on the Removal of Certain Principal Offic-
ers of the United States (Feb. 12, 2025). And he has chosen
to act on that belief—really, to take the law into his own
hands. Not since the 1950s (or even before) has a President,
without a legitimate reason, tried to remove an officer from
a classic independent agency—a multi-member, bipartisan
commission exercising regulatory power whose governing
statute contains a for-cause provision. Yet now the Presi-
dent has discharged, concededly without cause, several
such officers, including a member of the NLRB (Gwynne
Wilcox) and a member of the MSPB (Cathy Harris). Today,
this Court effectively blesses those deeds. I would not. Our
Humphrey’s decision remains good law, and it forecloses
both the President’s firings and the Court’s decision to
award emergency relief...

Finally, respondents Gwynne Wilcox and Cathy Harris
contend that arguments in this case necessarily implicate
the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections for
members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or
other members of the Federal Open Market Committee.
See Response of Wilcox in Opposition to App. for Stay 2−3,
27−28; Response of Harris in Opposition to App. for Stay 3,
5−6, 16−17, 36, 40. We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a
uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the
distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks
of the United States. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8.